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Abstract

The use of an integrated system framework, characterized by numerous cyber/physical components
(sensor measurements, signals to actuators) connected through wired/wireless networks, has not
only increased the ability to control industrial systems, but also the vulnerabilities to cyberattacks.
State measurement cyberattacks could pose threats to process control systems since feedback control
may be lost if the attack policy is not thwarted. Motivated by this, we propose three detection concepts based on Lyapunov-based economic model predictive control (LEMPC) for nonlinear systems.
The rst approach utilizes randomized modications to an LEMPC formulation online to potentially detect cyberattacks. The second method detects attacks when a threshold on the dierence
between state measurements and state predictions is exceeded. Finally, the third strategy utilizes
redundant state estimators to ag deviations from normal process behavior as cyberattacks.
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Introduction

The chemical process industries are potential targets for cyberattacks, with motivations for such
1, 2

attacks ranging from sabotage of equipment to intellectual property theft.

Attacks on elements

of control systems have the potential to create unsafe or economically unfavorable operating conditions. In light of this, attack detection has received focus in the literature (e.g.,

3, 4

). Attack detection

methods for cyber-physical systems have included those which are data-based for applications such
5

as water systems

∗

6

and smart grids.

In addition, resilient control designs based on state estimation
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have been developed for handling and detecting attacks. For example, Cardenas et al.

4

proposes

cyberattack-resilient control frameworks that compare state estimates based on representative mod7

els of the physical system and (potentially corrupted) state measurements to detect an attack. In,

the theoretical conditions for a linear system that bound the maximum number of sensors that may
provide false measurements while still allowing reconstruction of the state for a feedback controller
are dened.
The incorporation of cyberattack detection and resilience into control systems also has been
8

studied in the context of model predictive control (MPC ), an advanced control methodology that
uses optimization to determine the inputs to a plant. In the power systems domain, MPC has been
integrated with data-based detection and state reconstruction via a process model to recover performance of the power grid in the presence of sensor attacks.

9

For linear systems, MPC designs have

been explored that can guarantee exponential stability of the origin in the presence of suciently
10

short denial of service attacks,

guarantee boundedness of the closed-loop state in an invariant
11

set under random cyberattacks on the sensor measurements,
nonlinear systems, Chen et al.
veloped in

3

13

12

and handle replay attacks.

For

combined a neural network-based attack detection technique de-

with a two-layer control architecture, where the upper layer is a Lyapunov-based MPC,
14

to guarantee closed-loop stability after attacks are detected. Durand

explored several MPC tech15, 16

niques with economics-based objective functions (known as economic MPC's (EMPC's)

) in the

presence of false sensor measurements to explore cyberattacks in a nonlinear systems context. The
17

impacts of cyberattacks on MPC's were also related to process and equipment design in.

However,

further understanding of the interaction between cyberattack detection strategies and MPC/EMPC
formulation and stability guarantees is still needed.
This motivates our development in this work of three cyberattack detection strategies that
18

are integrated with a specic control framework known as Lyapunov-based EMPC (LEMPC),

enabling the co-design of the control and detection frameworks to provide guarantees regarding
detection characteristics and closed-loop stability in the absence of and, under sucient conditions
and potentially for limited timeframes, the presence of, cyberattacks. The rst control/detection
strategy toggles between a full state feedback LEMPC and variations on that control law that are

2

randomly generated over time to probe for cyberattacks.

The second control/detection strategy

also utilizes full state feedback LEMPC, but the detection is based on the state prediction from
the prior state measurement to identify an attack while maintaining the closed-loop state within
a characterizable region over one sampling period after an attack that is not detected.

Finally

the third control/detection concept is developed using output feedback LEMPC and comparing
multiple redundant state estimates based on the available state measurements to signal an attack
when the estimates do not agree while ensuring closed-loop stability under sucient conditions
(which include that not all sensors can be attacked).
19, 20

in.

This work extends the results presented

The attack type considered throughout is a sensor measurement cyberattack due to the
4

consistency of this attack with the attack design considered in various other works (e.g., ) and due
to the primary goal of this paper being an exploration of what might be possible to achieve with
integrated control/detection strategies utilizing LEMPC for nonlinear systems.

Preliminaries

Notation
The notation
function if

|·|

α(0) = 0

and the function is continuous and strictly increasing.

of a scalar-valued function
(i.e.,

V

(i.e.,

Ωρ := {x ∈ Rn : V (x) ≤ ρ}).

A/B := {x ∈ Rn : x ∈ A, x ∈
/ B}). xT

denoted by

α : [0, a) → [0, ∞)

signies the Euclidean norm of a vector.

tk := k∆, k = 0, 1, . . .,

where

∆

Ωρ

is a class

denotes a level set

′ ′

/

Set subtraction is signied by

is the transpose of the vector

x.

K

A sampling time is

is a sampling period.

Class of Systems
This work considers the following class of systems:

ẋ(t) = f (x(t), u(t), w(t))
where

x ∈ X ⊂ Rn , u ∈ U ⊂ Rm ,

respectively, and
and

f

and

w ∈ W ⊂ Rz

is locally Lipschitz on

U := {u ∈ Rm | |u| ≤ umax }.

X ×U ×W.

(1)

are the state, input, and disturbance vectors,
We dene

W := {w ∈ Rz | |w| ≤ θw , θw > 0}

We consider that the nominal system of Eq. 1 (w

is stabilizable such that there exists an asymptotically stabilizing feedback control law

3

≡ 0)

h(x),

a

suciently smooth Lyapunov function

V,

and class

K

functions

αi (·), i = 1, 2, 3, 4,

where:

α1 (|x|) ≤ V (x) ≤ α2 (|x|)

(2a)

∂V (x)
f (x, h(x), 0) ≤ −α3 (|x|)
∂x
∂V (x)
≤ α4 (|x|)
∂x

(2b)
(2c)

h(x) ∈ U
∀ x ∈ D ⊂ R n (D

(2d)

is an open neighborhood of the origin). We dene

region of the nominal closed-loop system under the controller
such that

x ∈ X , ∀x ∈ Ωρ .

Furthermore, we consider that

h(x)

h(x)

Ωρ ⊂ D

to be the stability

and require that it be chosen

satises:

|hi (x) − hi (x̂)| ≤ Lh |x − x̂|
for all

x, x̂ ∈ Ωρ ,

Because

V

with

Lh > 0,

where

hi

is the

i-th

component of

is a suciently smooth function and

f

(3)

h, i = 1, . . . , m.

is locally Lipschitz, the following hold:

|f (x1 , u1 , w) − f (x2 , u2 , 0)| ≤ Lx |x1 − x2 | + Lu |u1 − u2 | + Lw |w|

(4a)

∂V (x2 )
∂V (x1 )
f (x1 , u, w) −
f (x2 , u, 0) ≤ L′x |x1 − x2 | + L′w |w|
∂x
∂x

(4b)

|f (x, u, w)| ≤ Mf
∀x1 , x2 ∈ Ωρ , u, u1 , u2 ∈ U

and

w ∈ W,

where

Lx , L′x , Lw , L′w ,

(5)

and

Mf

are positive constants.

Observability assumption
We consider that there are

M

sets of measurements

yi ∈ Rqi , i = 1, . . . , M ,

available at

tk :

yi (t) = ki (x(t)) + vi (t)
where

ki

is a vector-valued function, and

the measurement

yi .

vi

(6)

represents the measurement noise associated with

We assume that the measurement noise is bounded (i.e.,

Rqi | |vi | ≤ θv,i , θv,i > 0)

and that measurements of each

considered that for each of the

M

yi

vi ∈ Vi := {vi ∈

are continuously available.

It is

sets of measurements, a deterministic observer exists dened as:

żi = Fi (ϵi , zi , yi )

4

(7)

where

zi

is the estimate of the process state from the

valued function, and

ϵi > 0.

When a controller

h(zi )

i-th

observer,

i = 1, . . . , M , Fi

is a vector-

with Eq. 7 is used to control the closed-loop

system of Eq. 1, we make the following assumptions.

Assumption 1.

21, 22

There exist positive constants

∗
θw ≤ θw∗ , θv,i ≤ θv,i
,

there exist

|zi (0) − x(0)| ≤ em0i

and

0 < ρ1,i < ρ, em0i > 0

ϵi ∈ (ϵ∗Li , ϵ∗U i ),

∗
θw∗ , θv,i
,

and

such that for each pair

ϵ∗Li > 0, ϵ∗U i > 0

{θw , θv,i }

such that if

with

x(0) ∈ Ωρ1,i ,

the trajectories of the closed-loop system are bounded in

Ωρ ,

∀ t ≥ 0.
Assumption 2.

21, 22

There exists

e∗mi > 0

such that for each

emi ≥ e∗mi ,

there exist tbi (ϵi ) such that

|zi (t) − x(t)| ≤ emi , ∀ t ≥ tbi (ϵi ).
23

Remark 1. High-gain observers,

which are typically analyzed for input-ane systems with a

specic structure (a sub-class of the class of systems of Eq. 1), can satisfy Assumptions 1-2 for
that class of input-ane systems under sucient conditions.

Lyapunov-based Economic Model Predictive Control
18

LEMPC

is dened by the optimization problem:

∫

tk+N

Le (x̃(τ ), u(τ )) dτ

min
u(t)∈S(∆)
s.t.

(8a)

tk

˙
x̃(t)
= f (x̃(t), u(t), 0)

(8b)

x̃(tk ) = x(tk )

(8c)

x̃(t) ∈ X, ∀ t ∈ [tk , tk+N )

(8d)

u(t) ∈ U, ∀ t ∈ [tk , tk+N )

(8e)

V (x̃(t)) ≤ ρe,1 ,

(8f )

if

x(tk ) ∈ Ωρe,1

∂V (x(tk ))
∂V (x(tk ))
f (x(tk ), u(tk ), 0) ≤
f (x(tk ), h(x(tk )), 0),
∂x
∂x
where the notation

x(tk ) ∈ Ωρ /Ωρe,1

(8g)

u(t) ∈ S(∆) denotes that u(t) is a piecewise-constant input vector with N

pieces

(N is the prediction horizon), each held for a sampling period of length
stage cost

Le

in Eq. 8 is evaluated from

tk

to

tk+N

with predictions

x̃

if

∆.

The time integral of the

of the process state obtained

from Eq. 8b (which represents the nominal model, i.e., the model of Eq. 1 with

5

w(t) ≡ 0).

Eq. 8b

is initialized from the measured state

x(tk )

at

tk

via Eq. 8c. Eqs. 8d-8e represent state and input

constraints, respectively. LEMPC is applied in a receding horizon fashion, with the optimal input
computed for
which renders

t ∈ [tk , tk+1 )
Ωρ

implemented in a sample-and-hold fashion.

Ωρe,1 ⊂ Ωρ

is a level set of

V

forward invariant under the LEMPC of Eq. 8.

Combining Cyberattack Detection and Process Control

In this section, we will develop several techniques for detecting and handling cyberattacks on
3

controllers that have a form like that in Eq. 8.

In a prior work by Wu et al.

that considered

cyberattack detection mechanisms for nonlinear systems in tandem with a variation on LEMPC, a
neural network-based detection method was designed to detect specic cyberattack scenarios (e.g., a
min-max cyberattack, in which the minimum or maximum allowable sensor measurement values are
provided to the control system), and the controller was assumed to use the state measurement from
secure/redundant sensors after an attack was detected to attempt to maintain the closed-loop state
3

in a bounded region of state-space. The data-based detection and control method from may achieve
appropriate performance for a cyberattack event, but does not guarantee that a cyberattack will be
detected. The present manuscript utilizes a control-theoretic, rather than data-based, framework
to develop three cyberattack detection methods. A goal of this is to avoid the potential limitation
of data-driven methods that they may lack guarantees on detection.

The rst control/detection

strategy uses a full state feedback LEMPC as the primary process controller and randomly develops
other LEMPC formulations with the contractive constraint of Eq. 8g always activated that are used
in place of the primary controller for short periods of time to potentially detect if an attack is
happening. The second control/detection strategy also uses full state feedback LEMPC, but the
detection method is based on the state prediction from the last state measurement and it maintains
the closed-loop state within the stability region over one sampling period after the attack under
sucient conditions. Finally, the third control/detection concept uses output feedback LEMPC and
state estimates based on the available state measurements to identify an attack while guaranteeing
that the closed-loop state will not leave the stability region under sucient conditions.

6

Detection Strategy 1: Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks
In this section, a potential methodology for probing for cyberattacks is proposed that uses
random modications of the control design in Eq. 8 in a way that should create an expected
outcome if no attack is occurring.

Specically, in the absence of an attack, if the contractive

constraint of Eq. 8g is activated, the time derivative of the Lyapunov function along the closed-loop
state trajectory under the controller

h(x)

is expected to be negative (this would only potentially

not occur if the closed-loop state was in a neighborhood of the steady-state), and therefore, when
Eq. 8g is activated, it would be expected that the Lyapunov function (evaluated at the state
measurements) should decrease for

t ∈ [tk , tk+1 ].

If this did not occur, the process behavior could

be considered abnormal, and could be agged as potentially reecting a cyberattack. However, a
stealthy attacker who knows the LEMPC control law might try to provide state measurements that
imply that the Lyapunov function decreases over the subsequent sampling period when that should
occur according to the formulation in Eq. 8, but cause rogue control actions to be computed. To
attempt to prevent this, we can consider randomly developing new control laws (here selected as
LEMPC's) with characterizable behavior in the absence of an attack (here, a decrease in the value
of the Lyapunov function for the randomly developed LEMPC for

t ∈ [tk , tk+1 ]),

and employ them

at random times to make it harder for an attacker to provide false state measurements that would
evade probing for attacks.
We refer to the LEMPC design around the operating steady-state as the (baseline)

Ωρ1 ,

which has stability region

h1

stability region subset

Ωρ′e,1 ,

Lyapunov function

used in its design. The alternative LEMPC's will be referred to as

with stability region

Ωρj ,

Lyapunov function

Vj ,

and controller

hj

V1 ,

1-LEMPC,

and controller

j -LEMPC designs (for j > 1)

used in the control design, and

developed around steady-states that are potentially dierent from the operating steady-state (the

j -th

steady-state, and

Uj

as the model of Eq. 1 rewritten to have its origin at the

j -th

x and u in deviation variable form from the j -th steady-state (Xj

and

steady-states). We also dene

xj

and

uj

as

fj

represent the state and input sets in deviation form from the

we assume that
and

Mf

Vj

and

replaced by

hj

satisfy Eqs. 2-5 with

j -th

steady-state). Furthermore,

αp (·), p = 1, 2, 3, 4, U , Lx , Lw , L′x , L′w , Lu , Lx , Lh

αp,j (·), p = 1, 2, 3, 4, Uj , Lx,j , Lw,j , L′x,j , L′w,j , Lu,j , Lx,j , Lh,j

7

and

Mf,j .

The implementation strategy for cyberattack probing uses random generation of steady-states
with stability regions contained within
inputs within

U

to develop new

Ωρ1

of the (baseline)

j -LEMPC (j > 1)

1-LEMPC

and that have steady-state

designs online which can drive the closed-loop

state toward the new (j -th) steady-state in the absence of a cyberattack. The LEMPC of Eq. 8
(with full state feedback) is used until a random sampling time

ts,j , j = 2, 3 . . .,

when

x(tk ) ∈ Ωρ1 ,

at which time it is desired to run a check to determine whether a cyberattack is occurring. At this
random time, a (j -th) steady-state is selected that has a stability region around it (Ωρj ,
contained within
an attack from

tk

Ωρ1 ,
to

that includes

tk+N

x(tk )

(to ensure that

so that closed-loop stability within

1-LEMPC

does not have

Vj

can be decreased in the absence of

if an LEMPC with Eq. 8g is used, which can only be guaranteed if the

initial condition is within the stability region for the

the

Vj

j > 1),

Ωρ1

j -LEMPC,

while being maintained within

can be maintained when the

j -th

Ωρ1

LEMPC switches back to

after probing). Furthermore, it must be ensured that the designed stability region

x(tk )

within a neighborhood of the origin of the new stability region within which

would not be guaranteed to decrease due to the sample-and-hold controller implementation and

disturbances. Once a suitable stability region is generated at

ts,j

LEMPC of the form of Eq. 8, but formulated with respect to the

meeting these requirements, an

j -th

steady-state and with Eq. 8g

always activated regardless of the position of the initial state, is selected to control the system for
the next sampling period. Under the sucient conditions to be developed in Section Randomized
LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks: Stability and Feasibility Analysis, this ensures a
decrease of

Vj

over the sampling period following

ts,j .

Then, at

te,j ,

the

j -LEMPC

switches back to

operation under the (baseline)

1-LEMPC. The false state measurement cyberattacks in this section

Ωρ1

to prevent detection on the basis of the state measurement being

are assumed to lie within

outside of the stability region that it should not exit.

Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks: Formulation
The following two LEMPC formulations are proposed to probe for cyberttacks by interchanging
between these LEMPC designs at random times.

These have a form like that in Eq. 8, but one

does not have the constraint of Eq. 8f, and both have dierent steady-states and Lyapunov-based
constraint designs compared to one another. The baseline LEMPC is formulated as follows, which

8

is used if

te,j−1 ≤ t < ts,j , j = 2, . . .,
∫

s.t.

te,1 = 0:

tk+N

min
u1 (t)∈S(∆)

where

Le (x̃1 (τ ), u1 (τ )) dτ

(9a)

tk

x̃˙ 1 (t) = f1 (x̃1 (t), u1 (t), 0)

(9b)

x̃1 (tk ) = x̃b,1 (tk )

(9c)

x̃1 (t) ∈ X1 , ∀ t ∈ [tk , tk+N )

(9d)

u1 (t) ∈ U1 , ∀ t ∈ [tk , tk+N )

(9e)

V1 (x̃1 (t)) ≤ ρ′e,1 , ∀ t ∈ [tk , tk+N ),

if

x̃1 (tk ) ∈ Ωρ′e,1

(9f )

∂V1 (x̃1 (tk ))
∂V1 (x̃1 (tk ))
f1 (x̃1 (tk ), u1 (tk ), 0) ≤
f1 (x̃1 (tk ), h1 (x̃1 (tk )), 0),
∂x
∂x

if

x̃1 (tk ) ∈ Ωρ1 /Ωρ′e,1
(9g)

where

x̃b,1 (tk )

is used, with slight abuse of notation, to reect the state measurement in deviation

variable form from the operating steady-state.
The

j -th

j > 1,

LEMPC,

∫

s.t.

where

x̃b,j (tk )

t ∈ [ts,j , te,j ),

is formulated as follows:

tk+N

min
uj (t)∈S(∆)

which is used for

Le (x̃j (τ ), uj (τ )) dτ

(10a)

tk

x̃˙ j (t) = fj (x̃j (t), uj (t), 0)

(10b)

x̃j (tk ) = x̃b,j (tk )

(10c)

x̃j (t) ∈ Xj , ∀ t ∈ [tk , tk+N )

(10d)

uj (t) ∈ Uj , ∀ t ∈ [tk , tk+N )

(10e)

∂Vj (x̃j (tk ))
∂Vj (x̃j (tk ))
fj (x̃j (tk ), uj (tk ), 0) ≤
fj (x̃j (tk ), hj (x̃j (tk )), 0)
∂x
∂x

(10f )

represents the state measurement in deviation variable form from the

state. A state measurement cyberattack on Eqs. 9-10 could cause

x̃b,1 (tk )

j -th

in Eq. 9c and

steady-

x̃b,j (tk )

in

Eq. 10c to not necessarily be reective of the actual process state.

Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks: Implementation Strategy
The implementation strategy for this detection method is as follows, and includes a region

Ωρsamp2,1 , which will be claried in Section Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks:
Stability and Feasibility Analysis and is chosen such that if the actual state is in

9

Ωρsamp2,1 ⊂ Ωρ1 ,

under sucient conditions, then the closed-loop state and the state measurement are maintained
in

Ωρ1

for

t ≥ 0:

1. At a sampling time
2. At

tk ,

ζ

an index

tk ,

the

1-LEMPC

receives the state measurement

is set to a random number.

x̃b,j (tk ).

If this number falls within a range that

has been selected to initiate probing for cyberattacks, randomly generate a
(j

> 1)

with a stability region

Ωρj ⊂ Ωρsamp2,1

bounds and contains the state measurement

Ωρsamp2,1 ,

Go to Step 2.

j -th

steady-state

that has a steady-state input within the input

x̃b,j (tk )

(and where

x̃b,j (tk ) ∈ Ωρh,j ⊂ Ωρj ⊂

which will be also claried in Section Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for

Cyberattacks: Stability and Feasibility Analysis and
measurement at

tk

is in

Ωρh,j ,

te,j = tk+1 ,

is selected such that if the state

under sucient conditions, then the closed-loop state and the

state measurement are maintained in
in a neighborhood

Ωρh,j

Ωρs,j ⊂ Ωρh,j

Ωρj

for

t ≥ 0,

with the measured value of the state not

of the origin of the

j -th

and go to Step 4. Otherwise, if the value of

ζ

steady-state). Set

ts,j = tk ,

select

falls in a range which has not been

selected to initiate probing for cyberattacks or the generation of a

j -th

steady-state meeting

the conditions above is not possible, go to Step 3.
3. If

x̃b,j (tk ) ∈ Ωρ′e,1 ,

go to Step 3a. Else, go to Step 3b.

(a) Compute a control action for the subsequent sampling period with Eq. 9f of the

1-LEMPC

activated. Go to Step 6.
(b) Compute a control action for the subsequent sampling period with Eq. 9g of the

1-

LEMPC activated. Go to Step 6.
4. The

j -LEMPC

Eq. 10.

receives the state measurement

x̃b,j (tk )

and controls the process according to

Evaluate the Lyapunov function throughout the sampling period.

decrease over the sampling period following

ts,j ,

If

Vj

does not

detect that the process is potentially under

a cyberattack and mitigating actions may be applied (e.g., a backup policy such as the use of
redundant sensors or an emergency shut-down mode). Go to Step 5.
5. At

te,j ,

switch back to operation under the

6. Go to Step 1 (k

1-LEMPC.

← k + 1).

10

Go to Step 6.

Remark 2. Though it is possible to set

te,j

to a value other than

tk+1 ,

this may have several

disadvantages: 1) it would cause the process to operate under a control law that is not the desired
control law for normal operation for a longer period of time, potentially impacting prots; and 2) if
the LEMPC of Eq. 10 is applied for a sucient number of sampling periods, the closed-loop state
would enter a neighborhood

Ωρ′s,j

in which the value of

Vj

is no longer guaranteed to decrease. This

could obscure the detection mechanism.

Remark 3. Both the random switching to and the generation of the

j -LEMPC's

are considered

helpful. If, for example, only the time of switching was randomized (i.e., there were only a 1-LEMPC
and a 2-LEMPC which could be activated at random times), an attacker may learn which control
laws are possible and subsequently attempt to provide false state measurements that indicate that
both

V1

and

V2

decrease over time so that regardless of whether the 1 or 2-LEMPC is activated, the

attack is not detected via the probing mechanism. If the switching time was not fully randomized
(e.g., probing was only performed when it would be less impactful on the economics than probing
would be from another state), this would also add a level of determinism to the policy that has
potential to be exploited by an attacker.

Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks: Stability and Feasibility Analysis
In this section, we prove recursive feasibility and closed-loop stability of the process of Eq. 1
under the LEMPC of Eqs. 9-10. The impacts of bounded process noise and disturbances on the
process state trajectory are characterized in Proposition 1 below, and Proposition 2 provides a
bound on the value of the Lyapunov function evaluated at dierent points in the stability region.

Proposition 1.

with initial states
exists a function

21, 20

Consider the systems below

ẋb,j = fj (xb,j (t), uj (t), w(t))

(11a)

x̃˙ b,j = fj (x̃b,j (t), uj (t), 0)

(11b)

|xb,j (t0 ) − x̃b,j (t0 )| ≤ δ
fW,j (·, ·)

with t0

= 0.

If

xb,j (t), x̃b,j (t) ∈ Ωρj

for

t ∈ [0, T ],

then there

such that:

|xb,j (t) − x̃b,j (t)| ≤ fW,j (δ, t − t0 )

11

(12)

for all

xb,j (t), x̃b,j (t) ∈ Ωρj , uj ∈ Uj ,

and

w ∈ W,

(
fW,j (s, τ ) :=
Proposition 2.

21

with

Lw,j θw
s+
Lx,j

Consider the Lyapunov function

variable form from the

j -th

)

for all

where

fVj (·)

hj (·)

steady-state, under the controller

1, in deviation

that satises Eqs. 2a-2d and 3

j -th steady-state.

There exists a quadratic

such that:

x̄, x̄′ ∈ Ωρj

Mv,j

(13)

Vj (·) of the nominal system of Eq.

for the model of Eq. 1 in deviation variable form from the
function

Lw,j θw
Lx,j

eLx,j τ −

Vj (x̄) ≤ Vj (x̄′ ) + fVj (|x̄ − x̄′ |)

(14)

−1
fVj (s) := α4,j (α1,j
(ρj ))s + Mv,j s2

(15)

with

is a positive constant.

The following theorem guarantees closed-loop stability of the process of Eq. 1 under the implementation strategy of Section Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks: Implementation Strategy when no cyberattack occurs (i.e., with probing, but no attacks, so that the
maximum value of
when

yi (t) = x(t)

δ

in Proposition 1 would be

θv′ ,

where

θv′

represents the value of

θv,i

for Eq. 6

(i.e., for full state measurement)).

Theorem 1. Consider the closed-loop system of Eq. 1 under the implementation strategy of Section

Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks: Implementation Strategy and in the
absence of a false sensor measurement cyberattack where each controller

i-LEMPC

meets the inequalities in Eqs. 2a-2d and 3 with respect to the

ϵWi > 0, ∆ > 0, N ≥ 1, Ωρj ⊂ Ωρsamp2,1 ⊂ Ωρ1 ⊂ X1
where
and
of

Ωρh,j

is dened as a level set of

Ωρj

for

where if

i-th

used in each

dynamic model. Let

j > 1, ρj > ρh,j > ρmin,j > ρs,j > ρ′s,j > 0,

that guarantees that if

ρ1 > ρsamp2,1 > ρsamp,1 > ρ′e,1 > ρmin,1 > ρs,1 > ρ′s,1 > 0,

Ωρ1

hi (·), i ≥ 1,

xb,1 (tk ) ∈ Ωρ1 /Ωρsamp,1 , x̃b,1 (tk ) ∈ Ωρ1 /Ωρ′e,1 ,

Vj (x̃b,j (tk )) ≤ ρh,j , Vj (xb,j (tk )) ≤ ρj ,

where

Ωρsamp,1

is dened as a level set

satisfy:

−1 ′
−α3,i (α2,i
(ρs,i )) + L′x,i Mf,i ∆ ≤ −ϵw,i /∆, i = 1, 2, . . .

(16)

ρ′e,1 + fV,1 (fW,1 (δ, ∆)) ≤ ρsamp2,1

(17)
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If

−1 ′
−α3,1 (α2,1
(ρe,1 )) + L′x,1 Mf,1 ∆ + L′x,1 δ + L′w,1 θw ≤ −ϵ′w,1 /∆

(18)

−1
−α3,j (α2,j
(ρs,j )) + L′x,j Mf,j ∆ + L′x,j δ + L′w,j θw ≤ −ϵ′w,j /∆, j = 1, 2, 3, . . .

(19)

ρmin,i = max{Vi (xb,i (t + ∆)) : xb,i (t) ∈ Ωρ′s,i }, i = 1, 2, . . .

(20)

ρsamp2,1 ≥ max{V1 (xb,1 (t + ∆)) : xb,1 (t) ∈ Ωρsamp,1 /Ωρ′e,1 }

(21)

ρ1 ≥ max{V1 (x̃b,1 (tk )) : xb,1 (tk ) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1 }

(22)

ρj ≥ max{Vj (x̃b,1 (tk )) : x̃b,j (tk ) ∈ Ωρh,j }, j = 2, 3, . . .

(23)

ρ′s,i < min{Vi (xb,i (tk )) : x̃b,i (tk ) ∈ Ωρs,i }, i = 1, 2, . . .

(24)

x̃b,1 (t0 ) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1 , xb,1 (t0 ) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1 , and |x̃b,i (tk )−xb,i (tk )| ≤ δ , k = 0, 1 . . ., then the closed-loop

state is maintained in
at

t0

and for

Ωρsamp2,1

and the state measurement is in

te,j−1 ≤ t < ts,j ,

or when the

j -LEMPC

Ωρ1

when the

is activated for

1-LEMPC

is activated

ts,j ≤ t < te,j

under the

implementation strategy of Section Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks: Implementation Strategy, and the closed-loop state and the state measurement are maintained within

t ≥ 0.

Ωρ1

for

and

x(t) ∈ Ωρj

Furthermore, in the sampling period after
for

ts,j ,

if

x̃b,j (tk ) ∈ Ωρj /Ωρs,j , Vj

decreases

t ∈ [tk , tk+1 ).

Proof. The proof consists of ve parts. In the rst part, recursive feasibility at every sampling time
under the implementation strategy is demonstrated. In the second part, it is demonstrated that the
closed-loop state and state measurement are maintained within

Ωρ1

when the

1-LEMPC

is used.

In the third part, it is shown that the closed-loop state and state measurement are maintained
within

Ωρj

when the

j -LEMPC

is used under the implementation strategy of Section Randomized

LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks: Implementation Strategy.

In the fourth part, it is

demonstrated that the closed-loop state and state measurement are always contained within
under the proposed implementation strategy.
sampling period after

Part 1.

ts,j , Vj

Ωρ1

Finally, in the fth part, it is shown that in the

decreases.

Both the LEMPC of Eq. 9 and that of Eq. 10 must be feasible whenever they are

activated according to the implementation strategy of Section Randomized LEMPC Changes to
Probe for Cyberattacks: Implementation Strategy. For both,
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hj

implemented in sample-and-hold

1-LEMPC

is a feasible input policy. Specically, when the

Ωρ1 ,

as will be proven below (Part 2).

h1

Under the conditions in Eqs. 16 and 20,
since

Ωρ1 ⊂ X1 ).

is activated, the closed-loop state is in

meets Eq. 9e from Eq. 2d and trivially satises Eq. 9g.

h1

satises Eq. 9f if

x̃b,1 (tk ) ∈ Ωρ1

24

(and thereby Eq. 9d

Specically, from Eq. 2b:

∂V1 (x̃b,1 (tp ))
f1 (x̃b,1 (tp ), h1 (x̃b,1 (tp )), 0) ≤ −α3,1 (|x̃b,1 (tp )|), p = k, . . . , k + N − 1
∂x
t ∈ [tp , tp+1 )

Therefore, for

and

p = k, . . . , k + N − 1

and

x̃b,1 (tp ) ∈ Ωρ′e,1 /Ωρ′s,1 :

∂V1 (x̃b,1 (t))
−1 ′
(ρs,1 )) + L′x,1 Mf,1 ∆
f1 (x̃b,1 (t), h1 (x̃b,1 (tp )), 0) ≤ −α3,1 (α2,1
∂x
where this inequality follows from adding and subtracting
to/from

∂V1 (x̃b,1 (t))
∂x

f1 (x̃b,1 (t), h1 (x̃b,1 (tp )), 0)

using Eqs. 2a,

4b, and 5. If Eq. 16 holds,

V1 (t) ≤ V1 (tp )

for

instead

t ∈ [tp , tp+1 )

x̃b,1 (tp ) ∈ Ωρ′s,1 ,

t ∈ [tp , tp+1 ),

so that if

(25)

∂V1 (x̃b,1 (tp ))
∂x

(26)

f1 (x̃b,1 (tp ), h1 (x̃b,1 (tp )), 0)

and applying the triangle inequality, and subsequently

∂V1 (x̃b,1 (t))
∂x

f1 (x̃b,1 (t), h1 (x̃b,1 (tp )), 0)

x̃b,1 (tp ) ∈ Ωρ′e,1 ,

then from Eq. 20 and

then

is negative such that

x̃b,1 (t) ∈ Ωρ′e,1 , ∀ t ∈ [tp , tp+1 ).

ρ′e,1 > ρmin,1 > ρs,1 > ρ′s,1 , x̃b,1 (t) ∈ Ωρmin,1 ⊂ Ωρ′e,1

If
for

as required by the constraint of Eq. 9f.

When instead the LEMPC utilized at a sampling time is the

j -LEMPC of Eq. 10, the implemen-

tation strategy of Section Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks: Implementation Strategy requires that

x̃b,j (tk ) ∈ Ωρh,j ⊂ Ωρj

and

xb,j (tk ) ∈ Ωρj .

Through the same arguments

as for the 1-LEMPC (except that there is no constraint of the form of Eq. 9f),

hj

in sample-and-hold

is a feasible solution to Eq. 10.

Part 2.

cases: Case 1) the actual process state at

x̃b,1 (t0 ))

x̃b,1 (t0 ) ∈ Ωρ′e,1 ;

at

t0

3)

xb,1 (t0 ) ∈ Ωρsamp,1 /Ωρ′e,1

(i.e.,

1-LEMPC

To demonstrate the case when the

is

but

t0 (xb,1 (t0 ))

Case 2)

is

is used, we divide the proof into four

xb,1 (t0 ) ∈ Ωρ′e,1

xb,1 (t0 ) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1 /Ωρ′e,1

x̃b,1 (t0 ) ∈ Ωρ′e,1 ;

and Case 4)

and

From Propositions 1 and 2, if

x̃b,1 (t0 ) ∈ Ωρ1 /Ωρ′e,1 ;

xb,1 (t0 ) ∈ Ωρ′e,1

Part 2 Case 1. If the state measurement used by the LEMPC is

V1 (x̃b,1 (t1 )) ≤ ρ′e,1 .

and the state measurement

xb,1 (t1 ) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1 ,

but

x̃b,1 (t0 ) ∈ Ωρ1 /Ωρ′e,1 .

x̃b,1 (t0 ) ∈ Ωρ′e,1 ,

xb,1 (t1 ) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1

then follows from Eq. 17.
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from Eq. 9f,

then:

V1 (xb,1 (t1 )) ≤ V1 (x̃b,1 (t1 )) + fV,1 (|x̃b,1 (t1 ) − xb,1 (t1 )|) ≤ ρ′e,1 + fV,1 (fW,1 (δ, ∆))
The assumption that

Case

(27)

Part 2 Case 2. If

x̃b,1 (t0 ) ∈ Ωρ1 /Ωρ′e,1

is the state measurement, Eq. 9g and Eq. 2b give:

∂V1 (x̃b,1 (t0 ))
f1 (x̃b,1 (t0 ), u∗1 (t0 ), 0) ≤ −α3,1 (|x̃b,1 (t0 )|)
∂x
u∗i (t0 )

V1

along the

∂V1 (xb,1 (τ ))
−1 ′
f1 (xb,1 (τ ), u∗1 (t0 ), w(τ )) ≤ −α3,1 (α2,1
(ρe,1 )) + L′x,1 Mf,1 ∆ + L′x,1 δ + L′w,1 θw
∂x

(29)

where

i-LEMPC

is the optimal solution of the

closed-loop state trajectories of

xb,1

from

t0

to

t1

at

t0 .

(28)

The time derivative of

satises:

∂V1 (x̃b,1 (t0 ))
f1 (x̃b,1 (t0 ), u∗1 (t0 ), 0)
∂x

from

∂V1 (xb,1 (τ ))
f1 (xb,1 (τ ), u∗1 (t0 ), w(τ )) and using Eq. 28, the triangle inequality, the denition of
∂x

x̃b,1 (t0 ),

which

follows

from

adding

Eq. 5, Eq. 2a, and the fact that
for

τ ∈ [t0 , t1 ),

so that

Part 2 Case 3. If

and

subtracting

x̃b,1 (t0 ) ∈ Ωρ1 /Ωρ′e,1 .

If Eq. 18 holds, then

V1 (xb,1 (t)) ≤ V1 (xb,1 (t0 )), ∀ t ∈ [t0 , t1 ),

xb,1 (t0 ) ∈ Ωρsamp,1 /Ωρ′e,1 ,

Part 2 Case 4. If the actual state

and thus

then from Eq. 21,

xb,1 (t0 ) ∈ Ωρ′e,1

V̇1 (xb,1 (τ )) ≤ −ϵ′w,1 /∆

xb,1 (t) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1 .

V1 (xb,1 (t)) ≤ ρsamp2,1 , ∀ t ∈ [t0 , t1 ).

and the state measurement

x̃b,1 (t0 ) ∈ Ωρ1 /Ωρ′e,1

is provided to the LEMPC, Eq. 9g is enforced. From the proof for Case 2, this causes

V1 (xb,1 (t0 )), ∀ t ∈ [t0 , t1 )
∀ t ∈ [t0 , t1 ).

If

if Eq. 18 holds and

xb,1 (t0 ) ∈ Ωρ′s,1 ,

then

xb,1 (t) ∈ Ωρmin,1 ⊂ Ωρsamp2,1 ,

Part 2 Cases 2-4 indicate that if
Applying this recursively,

xb,1

xb,1 (t0 ) ∈ Ωρ′e,1 /Ωρs,1 ,

xb,1 (t0 ) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1 ,

stays within

Ωρsamp2,1

then

such that

for

with

xb,j (tk ) ∈ Ωρj

j -LEMPC

is used (for

j > 1)

V1 (xb,1 (t)) ≤ ρsamp2,1 ,

t ∈ [t0 , t1 ),

from Eq. 20.

xb,1 (t) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1

for

t ∈ [t0 , t1 ).

throughout the time period that the

is used. Then, Eq. 22 indicates that the state measurement is always in

Part 3. When the

V1 (xb,1 (t)) ≤

(i.e.,

x̃b,j (tk )

1-LEMPC

Ωρ1 .

must be in

Ωρh,j ⊂ Ωρj ⊂ Ωρsamp2,1

by the implementation strategy of Section Randomized LEMPC Changes to

Probe for Cyberattacks: Implementation Strategy and Eq. 23), if

x̃b,j (tk ) ∈ Ωρh,j /Ωρs,j , j > 1

(as

required in Section  Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks: Implementation
Strategy), is the state measurement used by the LEMPC according to the implementation strategy
of Section Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks: Implementation Strategy,
Eqs. 10f and Eq. 2b give:

∂Vj (x̃b,j (tk ))
fj (x̃b,j (tk ), u∗j (tk ), 0) ≤ −α3,j (|x̃b,j (tk )|)
∂x
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(30)

Following a similar procedure as in Part 2 Case 2, the time derivative of
state trajectory of

xb,j

from

tk

to

tk+1

Vj

along the closed-loop

satises the following:

∂Vj (xb,j (τ ))
−1
(ρs,j )) + L′x,j Mf,j ∆ + L′x,j δ + L′w,j θw
fj (xb,j (τ ), u∗j (tk ), w(τ )) ≤ −α3,j (α2,j
∂x
which

follows

from

adding

and

subtracting

∂Vj (x̃b,j (tk ))
fj (x̃b,j (t0 ), u∗j (tk ), 0)
∂x

to

(31)

and

∂Vj (xb,j (τ ))
fj (xb,j (τ ), u∗j (tk ), w(τ )) and using Eq. 30, the triangle inequality, the denition of
∂x
Eq. 5, Eq. 2a, and the fact that

xb,j (tk ) ∈ Ωρh,j /Ωρs,j

always activated and Eq. 24. If Eq. 19 holds, then

Vj (xb,j (t)) ≤ Vj (xk ), ∀ t ∈ [tk , tk+1 ),

and thus

from

x̃b,j (tk ),

with the contractive constraint of Eq. 10f

V̇j (xb,j (τ )) ≤ −ϵ′w,j /∆

for

τ ∈ [tk , tk+1 ),

so that

xb,j (t) ∈ Ωρj ⊂ Ωρsamp2,1 .

Part 4. To demonstrate that the closed-loop state is always maintained within

Ωρ1

that the measurement is always contained in

Ωρsamp2,1

and

under the implementation strategy of Section

Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks: Implementation Strategy, we proceed
by induction. Consider rst the conditions at
that the state measurement is within
state measurement at
activated) or a

t1

is within

j -LEMPC

Ωρ1 .

If instead the

At

t0 , x(t0 ) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1 ,

Part 2 guarantees that

once again. At

tk , k > 0,

and Eq. 22 guarantees

x(t1 ) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1

and that the

either the 1-LEMPC (if Eq. 9 is

(if Eq. 10 is randomly selected to be activated) is used. If the 1-LEMPC

is used, Part 2 guarantees that
in

Ωρ1

Ωρ1 .

t0 .

xb,j (tk+1 ) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1

j -LEMPC

is used, then

and that the measurement at

xb,j (tk ) ∈ Ωρj ⊂ Ωρsamp2,1

j -LEMPC.

When

is contained

or else the implementation

strategy of Section Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks:
Strategy would not have allowed the use of the

tk+1

Implementation

xb,j (tk ) ∈ Ωρj ⊂ Ωρsamp2,1

(by the

conditions of the implementation strategy in Section Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for
Cyberattacks: Implementation Strategy), Part 3 above guarantees that

∀ t ∈ [t0 , t1 ]

and that the measurement is in

Ωρj ⊂ Ωρsamp2,1 ,

xb,j (t) ∈ Ωρj ⊂ Ωρsamp2,1 ,

which is also a subset of

assumptions of the theorem. Therefore, at t0 , regardless of whether the 1-LEMPC or the
is activated, the closed-loop state is still within

Ωρsamp2,1

Ωρ1

by the

j -LEMPC

and the state measurement is within

Ωρ1

throughout the subsequent sampling period and at the subsequent sampling time. Applying this
recursively indicates that the closed-loop state and state measurement are contained within
and

Ωρ1 ,

respectively, at all times.
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Ωρsamp2,1

Part 5.

Finally, we demonstrate that

Vj , j > 1,

ts,j

decreases in a sampling period after

by noting that the implementation strategy of Section Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe
for Cyberattacks: Implementation Strategy requires that the
actual state is within
Eq. 24 and

Ωρ′s,j

Ωρh,j

and within

decrease for

Ωρj /Ωρ′s,j

(i.e., the measurement is within

satises Eq. 23).

Ωρj .

j -LEMPC

only be activated if the

Ωρh,j /Ωρs,j ,

Ωρs,j

where

satises

This ensures that the actual value of the state is outside of

Therefore, because Eq. 19 holds for

xb,j (tk ) ∈ Ωρj /Ωρ′s,j ,

the value of

Vj

will

t ∈ [tk , tk+1 ).
Ωρi , i = 1, 2, . . .

Remark 4. A number of regions are dened in the above theorem.

has been

described as an invariant set in which it is desired to maintain the closed-loop state and state
estimates, and
Eq. 9).

Ωρ′e,1

is a region used in dierentiating between whether Eq. 9f or 9g is used in

Ωρmin,i , i = 1, 2, . . .,

is dened via Eq. 20 as the maximum value of

Vi

evaluated for the

actual state that can be reached within a sampling period if the actual state is within
sampling time, and any input in the input bounds is applied to the system.

Ωρsamp,1

Ωρ′s,i

at a

is dened as a

region where, if the actual closed-loop state is within this region at a sampling time, the maximum
distance that the closed-loop state would be able to go within a sampling period is into

Ωρsamp,1

is important to characterize due to the presence of measurement noise; specically, in the

presence of measurement noise, there may be some range of states outside of
possible that with
the

Ωρsamp2,1 .

1-LEMPC,

Ωρ′e,1

|x̃b,j (tk )−xb,j (tk )| < δ , the measured state may be within Ωρ′e,1 .

where it is still

In this case, under

the constraint of Eq. 9f would be activated, though if the true state measurement

was known, the constraint of Eq. 9g would be activated. To prevent this discrepancy from leading
to closed-loop stability issues,

Ωρsamp,1

is dened as a region within

Ωρ1

where with the bound

δ

on

the dierence between the actual and measured values of the state, the measured state could still
be within

Ωρ′e,1 . Ωρsamp2,1

is then dened to be within

Ωρ1

so that the maximum distance that the

closed-loop state could travel when the state measurement is within
outside of it is still within
actual state is within

Ωρ1 .

Ωρsamp2,1 ,

Ωρ′e,1

but the actual state is

Not only is the actual state then dened to be within

Ωρ1

when the

but the state measurement is then also required to be within

(Eq. 22). Furthermore, because Eqs. 9g and 10f only enforce a decrease condition on

17

Ωρ1

Vj , j = 2, 3, . . .,

when the closed-loop state is within

Ωρj /Ωρ′s,j , the implementation strategy of Section Randomized

LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks: Implementation Strategy requires that the actual
value of the closed-loop state be outside of
inside

Ωρj ,

is within

we dene the region

Ωρh,j

at

tk ,

ρh,j

in Eq. 23 as a within

Vj

Ωρ′s,j ,

Ωρs,j

at

tk ,

Ωρj .

Ωρj

is

However, due to measurement noise, the

Ωρ′s,j ,

which could

to decrease over a sampling period following the activation of the constraint

Ωρs,j

in Eq. 24 such that if the state measurement

the actual state value is still outside of

Eq. 16 guarantees that

tk

such that if the state measurement

but the actual state may be within

of Eq. 10f. To prevent this, we dene the region
is within

First, to guarantee that the actual state at

the actual state value is inside

measured value may be outside of
impact the ability of

Ωρ′s,j .

Vj

Ωρ′s,j

so that meeting the condition of

will decrease in the following sampling period.

Remark 5. According to the proof above, the LEMPC formulation is designed to account for suciently small disturbances and measurement noise. Therefore, the lack of a decrease in the Lyapunov
function under the proposed control/detection strategy would not be due to plant/model mismatch
or sensor noise if the conditions of Theorem 1 are met. Furthermore, if
sampling period after

ts,j

Vj

does not decrease over a

when computed using the sensor measurements, this strategy detects the

attack even if all sensors are compromised.

Remark 6. If the control law is changed at a sampling period, the attacker may try to detect
this and determine which control law a given control action throughout a sampling period could
have been derived from to attempt to ensure that the false state measurement that they provide
at the beginning of the next sampling period causes the expected behavior of

Vj .

However, since

the control action is being implemented in sample-and-hold over the sampling period, there is not
much data on the control law available from

u∗i

for the attacker then to work from. If the LEMPC

is computing set-points for regulatory controllers, these controllers would not be providing more
information on what control law (i.e., Lyapunov function) the LEMPC used. When measurements
of the state are available more frequently than every sampling period, an attacker may not be able
to falsify all of the measurements immediately after

ts,j

control law, which has potential to reveal the attack if
the sampling period after

ts,j

until they are aware of the change in the

Vj

does not decrease for any fraction of

due to this. However, Detection Strategy 1 has no guarantees that
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it will detect an attack. When an attack occurs, the sensor measurements are falsied, and that
can compromise closed-loop stability before that attack is detected, and may also result in a false
sensor measurement trajectory that happens to decrease

Vj .

There is no guarantee that a probing

maneuver will be activated at a time when it could reveal an attack. The concept of the method
is that it could be used to ag a false sensor measurement cyberattack if it does not cause

Vj

to

decrease when it should be.

Remark 7. The worst-case rate at which
of the

j -LEMPC

Vj

will decrease over a sampling period following activation

could be slow, in which case a practical sensor may not register the decrease in

the value of the Lyapunov function even if it is occurring. Therefore, from a practical perspective,
there could be cases where a suciently long period of time might be needed for the decrease in
the Lyapunov function to be registered by a practical sensing device, and that amount of time may
or may not be equivalent to one sampling period after the probing mechanism is triggered.

Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks: Chemical Process Example
In this section, a chemical process example is used to demonstrate the implementation of Detection Strategy 1, as well as to highlight the limitation of this method in that it is not guaranteed to
detect attacks. The nonlinear process model consists of a continuous stirred tank reactor (CSTR)
with a second-order, exothermic, irreversible reaction of the form

A→B

with the following process

dynamics:

F
− E
(CA0 − CA ) − k0 e Rg T CA2
V
F
∆Hk0 − REg T 2
Q
Ṫ = (T0 − T ) −
e
CA +
V
ρ L Cp
ρL Cp V
ĊA =

where the states are the reactant concentration of species
and

A)

T,

respectively). The manipulated inputs are

and the heat rate

T0 , ρL , ∆H ,

and

Cp )

Q.

are taken from.

3
kmol/m

(33)

and temperature in the reactor (CA

(the reactant feed concentration of species

The values of the parameters of the CSTR model (F ,
25

0

x1s = [CAs Ts ]T = [1.22

T
kJ/h] , respectively, are

u1 = [u1,1 u1,2 ]T = [CA0 −CA0s Q−Qs ]T .

V , k0 , E , Rg ,

The vectors of deviation variables for the states and

inputs from their operating steady-state values,

[CA0s Qs ]T = [4.0

CA0

A

(32)

3
kmol/m

438.2

x1 = [x1,1 x1,2 ]T = [CA − CAs T − Ts ]T

T
K] ,
and

The process model represented by Eqs. 32-33 is numerically
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integrated using the explicit Euler method with integration step of
cost is selected to be

Le = k0 e−E/(RT ) CA2 .

10−4

h.

The economic stage

Despite the simplicity of this case study, it is illustrative

for the cyberattack detection methods without convoluting the results through a more complex
example, and the theoretical results of this work hold in the case of more complex processes.
The controller receives a state measurement subject to bounded measurement noise and the process is subject to bounded disturbances. The noise is represented by a standard normal distribution

3
3
with mean zero, standard deviations of 0.002 kmol/m and 0.5 K, and bounds of 0.002 kmol/m and
0.5 K for the concentration of the reactant and reactor temperature, respectively. Process disturbances were added to the right-hand side of the dierential equations describing the rates of change
of

CA

and

T

3
with zero mean and standard deviations of 0.5 kmol/m h and 2 K/h, and bounds of 2

3
kmol/m h and 5 K/h, respectively. The baseline LEMPC formulation used Lyapunov-based stability constraints were designed using a Lyapunov function
In the selected Lyapunov-based controller

3
kmol/m for simplicity and
was dened with
set to 10 and

ρ1 = 300

0.01

P = [1200 5; 5 0.1].

h1 (xb,1 ) = [h1,1 (xb,1 ) h1,2 (xb,1 )]T , h1,1 (xb,1 )

was designed via Sontag's control law.

Ωρ1 = {x1 ∈ R2 : V1 (xb,1 ) ≤ ρ1 }),

and

was set to 0

The stability region

ρ′e,1 = 225. N

and

∆

were

h, respectively.

The process was simulated for 0.1 h of operation, initialized at

[−0.21

where
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h1,2 (xb,1 )
(i.e.,

V1 = xTb,1 P xb,1 ,

x1,init = [x1,1 (t0 ) x1,2 (t0 )]T =

3
T
kmol/m 28.89 K] in MATLAB R2016b using fmincon. In the LEMPC, the value of the

decision variable corresponding to

Q

was scaled down by

105 ,

and probing was initialized at

t0 .

Four simulations were performed: two in which the original steady-state and stability region were
utilized for probing (i.e., a constraint of the form of Eq. 10f was enforced at the end of the rst
sampling period, and no constraint of the form in Eq. 9f was used), and two in which a modied
steady-state and stability region were utilized for probing. The modied steady-state (x2s ) has a
stability region in

x2s = [1.22

Ωρ1

3
kmol/m

V2 (x) = xT2 P2 x2 ,

and includes

450

where

x1,init .

Specically, the new steady-state was selected to be

T
K] . The stability region around this new steady-state is dened using

x2 = x1 + x1s − x2s ,

Ωρ2 = {x2 ∈ R2 : V2 (x2 ) ≤ ρ2 }).

with

P2 = [2100 10; 10 0.25],

and

ρ2 = 100

(i.e.,

The modied LEMPC design was formulated with respect to

and designed using a Lyapunov-based controller with
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h2,1 (xb,2 ) = 0

3
kmol/m and

h2,2 (xb,2 )

x2

selected
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Figure 1: V1 (top plots) and V2 (bottom plots) proles over 0.1 h of operation for the process example in the presence
of dierent cyberattack policies.
using Sontag's control law with respect to

V2 (xb,2 ).

Two cyberattacks were simulated on the two dierent probing formulations: 1) Attack 1: A
constant false state measurement
starting at

8.0 + 0.1r

t0 ;

x1,1 = 0.1

3
kmol/m ,

x1,2 = 10

K is provided to the LEMPC's

2) Attack 2: A false state measurement of the form

K, with

r

x1,1 = −0.17

3
kmol/m ,

x1,2 =

increasing by one from 1 to 9 at each sampling time until the 9th sampling

time and then keeping

r

at 9, is provided to the controller starting at

t0 .

proles that result when the attacks and probing are both initialized at
It can be seen that under Attack 1, whether the value of

V1

or

V2

The

t0

V1 (x̃b,1 )

and

V2 (x̃b,2 )

are presented in Fig. 1.

is monitored over time, the attack

would be detected, whereas if the probing was only undertaken for a sampling period as suggested
in the theory (it is applied for the entire 0.1 h simulation in Fig. 1), Attack 2 would not be detected
with either probing strategy.

Remark 8. In general with the proposed method, until the probing starts, an LEMPC may not be
driving a process toward the steady-state so that there would not necessarily be a decrease in the
Lyapunov function expected over a sampling period before a probing maneuver.

Detection Strategy 2: Cyberattack-Mitigating State Feedback LEMPC
Detection Strategy 1 described in Section Detection Strategy 1: Randomized LEMPC Changes
to Probe for Cyberattacks may identify a cyberattack by taking advantage of LEMPC's properties,
but it does not guarantee closed-loop stability in the presence of an attack (and as shown in the
example of the prior section, there can be many cases in which the method fails to detect attacks). A
20, 17

strategy suggested in

could be used instead to give a detection strategy that provides short-term
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guarantees that the closed-loop state is maintained in a bounded region of operation after an attack
on the sensor measurements (even, potentially, all of the measurements). Specically, this second
detection strategy uses state predictions from the process model from the last state measurement to
identify an attack if the predictions deviate too signicantly from the measurements. When the norm
of the dierence between the state measurement and the state prediction is above a threshold, the
measurement is agged as a possible sensor attack. When the dierence is below a threshold, then
even if the measurement was falsied, the closed-loop state can be maintained in

Ωρ1

for a sampling

period after the attack if the process is operated under an LEMPC with a suciently conservative
design (if the attack is not detected at tk , an auxiliary detection mechanism (e.g., machine learning
3

detection methods ) could be used in addition to attempt to identify a cyberattack on the sensor
measurements to avoid the potential that the closed-loop state may leave

Ωρ1

after

tk+1 ).

The

developments below will focus on the case that the 1-LEMPC of Eq. 9 is used to control the process
at all times.

Cyberattack-Mitigating State Feedback LEMPC: Implementation Strategy
The implementation strategy for this detection/control method is as follows, where
denotes the prediction of the state
from a measurement at

1. At sampling time

tk−1
tk ,

if

until

x̃b,1

at

tk

x̃b,1 (tk |tk−1 )

evaluated by integrating the dynamic model of Eq. 9b

tk :

|x̃b,1 (tk |tk−1 ) − x̃b,1 (tk |tk )| > ν ,

detect that a cyberattack is occurring

and go to Step 1a. Else, go to Step 1b.
(a) Apply a backup strategy or enter an emergency shut-down mode.
(b) Operate the process under the LEMPC of Eq. 9 while employing an auxiliary detection
mechanism to attempt to ag any un-detected attack at

tk . tk ← tk+1 .

Go to Step 1.

Cyberattack-Mitigating State Feedback LEMPC: Stability and Feasibility Analysis
The following theorem guarantees that in the presence of bounded measurement noise and disturbances, the implementation strategy of Section Cyberattack-Mitigating State Feedback LEMPC:
Implementation Strategy maintains the closed-loop state within
for at least one sampling period after the attack.

22

Ωρ1

before an attack occurs and

Theorem 2.
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Consider the system of Eq. 1 in closed-loop under the implementation strategy

of Section Cyberattack-Mitigating State Feedback LEMPC: Implementation Strategy based on a
controller

h1 (·)

hold with

ts,j = ∞, j = 2, 3, . . .,

that satises the assumptions of Eqs. 2a-2d and 3. Let the conditions of Theorem 1

xb,1 (t0 ) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1 ,
Ωρ1

then

and

δ ≥ fW,1 (θv′ , ∆) + ν .

xb,1 (t) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1

for all times before a sampling time

xb,1 (t) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1

for

t ∈ [tA , tA + ∆),

Proof. Theorem 1 guarantees that

xb,1 (t) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1

for

x̃b,1 (t|tk−1 )

x̃b,1 (t0 ) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1 ⊂ Ωρ1

tA

that a cyberattack falsies a state measurement, and

x̃b,1 (t) ∈ Ωρ1

tA .

and

xb,1 (t) ∈ Ωρsamp2,1

for

t < tA .

x̃b,1 (tk−1 |tk−1 )

consider the measurements

from the nominal model of Eq. 9b for

bounded measurement noise assumption,

|x̃b,1 (tk−1 |tk−1 ) − xb,1 (tk−1 )| ≤ θv′ .

To prove that
and

t ∈ [tk−1 , tk ].

x̃b,1 (tk |tk ),
From the

Proposition 1 gives:

|xb,1 (tk ) − x̃b,1 (tk |tk−1 )| ≤ fW,1 (θv′ , ∆)
If an attack is not agged at

and

and the state measurement at each sampling time is in

if the attack is not detected at

t ∈ [tA , tA + ∆),

and the predicted state

If

(34)

tk :

|xb,1 (tk ) − x̃b,1 (tk |tk )| ≤ |xb,1 (tk ) − x̃b,1 (tk |tk−1 ) + x̃b,1 (tk |tk−1 ) − x̃b,1 (tk |tk )|
≤ fW,1 (θv′ , ∆) + |x̃b,1 (tk |tk−1 ) − x̃b,1 (tk |tk )| ≤ fW,1 (θv′ , ∆) + ν

(35)

where the last inequality follows from the fact that the implementation strategy would have agged
the attack at

tk

if

|x̃b,1 (tk |tk−1 ) − x̃b,1 (tk |tk )| > ν .

Finally, when

δ

fW,1 (θv′ , ∆)+ν , then the closed-loop state is maintained within Ωρsamp2,1
period according to the proof of Theorem 1 if there is an attack at

in Theorem 1 satises

δ ≥

over the subsequent sampling

tk .

Remark 9. One could consider employing Detection Strategy 1 as an auxiliary detection mechanism
with Detection Strategy 2 if the

j -LEMPC

is activated at the beginning of one of the sampling

periods over which closed-loop stability is still maintained after an attack (but Detection Strategy
1 is not guaranteed to detect the attack).

Remark 10. The value of the threshold

ν

is a design decision that should be specied considering

Eq. 35 and the conditions of Theorem 1. Specically, larger values of

ν

require a more conservative

stability region. However, overly conservative values could cause false alarms, since there is some
dierence between the state measurement and state prediction due to noise and disturbances.
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Detection Strategy 3: Cyberattack-Resilient Output Feedback LEMPC
Detection Strategy 2 ensures that the closed-loop state is maintained in

Ωρ1

for only one sampling

period after an attack occurs. Detection Strategy 3, which guarantees that the closed-loop state is
maintained in a bounded region of operation for all time, uses multiple redundant state estimators
(where at least one cannot be impacted by the false sensor measurements) coupled with an output
feedback LEMPC. This method extends the results in

19

by considering that multiple state estimators

may be impacted by a cyberattack.

Cyberattack-Resilient Output Feedback LEMPC: Formulation
The output feedback LEMPC design used for this detection strategy is formulated to receive a
state estimate

z1

from one of the redundant state estimators (the estimator used to provide state

estimates to the LEMPC will be denoted as the
of Eq. 8 with Eq. 8c replaced by

x̃(tk ) = z1 (tk );

i=1

estimator) at

tk .

The notation follows that

we will subsequently refer to this LEMPC as the

output feedback LEMPC of Eq. 8.
Detection Strategy 3 guarantees that any cyberattacks which would drive the closed-loop state
out of

Ωρ

will be detected before this occurs. It recognizes cyberattacks by agging deviations of the

state estimates from normal behavior; however, as normal behavior includes both measurement
noise and disturbances (Eqs. 1 and 6), care must be taken in setting the threshold on the state
estimate deviation from a normal value to avoid false detections. With slight abuse of notation
compared to that used in describing Detection Strategies 1 and 2, we here revert to the use of
(rather than

M

xb,j (t)))

to denote the actual state at time

t.

x(t)

We consider that at least one of the

state estimators is not aected by false state measurements (i.e., up to

M −1

state estimators

are receiving measurements for which at least some subset of them are falsied). To determine a
threshold, we note that the bounds in Assumption 2 imply that the following holds:

|zi (t) − zj (t)| = |zi (t) − x(t) + x(t) − zj (t)| ≤ |zi (t) − x(t)| + |zj (t) − x(t)|
(36)

≤ ϵij := (e∗mi + e∗mj ) ≤ ϵmax := max{ϵij }
for all

i ̸= j , i = 1, . . . , M , j = 1, . . . , M ,

abnormal behavior can be detected if

as long as

t ≥ tq = max{tb1 , . . . , tbM }.

|zi (tk ) − zj (tk )| > ϵmax

In practice, it may not be possible to know the numbers
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if

e∗mi

tk > tq
and

Therefore,

(this avoids false detections).

e∗mj ,

as they can only be known

by knowing an upper bound on how far o each

zi (t)

is from

x(t),

which may not be known since

full state feedback may not be available. By using Eq. 36 with data from an attack-free scenario,
a bound may be able to be placed on the possible value of

zj (t)

ϵmax

based on how far apart

are over time. In the following, we will assume that the upper bound

ϵmax

zi (t)

and

can be determined.

Cyberattack-Resilient Output Feedback LEMPC: Implementation Strategy
This implementation strategy assumes that the process has already been run successfully in the
absence of attacks under the output feedback LEMPC of Eq. 8 for some time such that

ϵ∗mi

for all

i = 1, . . . , M

1. At sampling time

Ωρ

(where

z1

|zi (t)−x(t)| ≤

before an attack:

tk ,

if

|zi (tk ) − zj (tk )| > ϵmax , i = 1, . . . , M , j = 1, . . . , M ,

or

z1 (tk ) ∈
/

is the state estimate used in the EMPC design), detect that a cyberattack is

occurring and go to Step 1a. Else, go to Step 1b.
(a) Enter an emergency shut-down mode that no longer operates the process under the
output feedback LEMPC of Eq. 8.
(b) Operate using the output feedback LEMPC of Eq. 8.

tk ← tk+1 .

Go to Step 1.

Cyberattack-Resilient Output Feedback LEMPC: Stability and Feasibility Analysis
This section details feasibility and closed-loop stability results for systems of Eq. 1 under the
implementation strategy of Section Cyberattack-Resilient Output Feedback LEMPC: Implementation Strategy. We rst present a proposition that bounds the worst-case dierence between the
state estimate used by the output feedback LEMPC of Eq. 8 and the actual value of the process
state under the implementation strategy when an attack is not agged.
Proposition

3. Consider the system of Eq. 1 under the implementation strategy of Section

Cyberattack-Resilient Output Feedback LEMPC: Implementation Strategy where

M >1

state es-

timators develop independent estimates of the process state and at least one of these estimators is
not impacted by false state measurements being provided to the estimators (and the attacks do not
begin until after

tq ).

If a false sensor measurement cyberattack is not agged at

the implementation strategy, then the worst-case dierence between

z1

tk

according to

and the actual state

x(tk )

is

given by:

|z1 (tk ) − x(tk )| ≤ ϵ∗M := ϵmax + max{e∗mj }, j = 1, . . . , M

25

(37)

Proof. Two cases must be considered: Case 1)

z1

is not impacted by the attack; Case 2)

z1

is

impacted by the attack.

Case 1. When

tk > tq .

z1

is not impacted by an attack,

|z1 (tk ) − x(tk )|

is given by Assumption 2 for

Specically, Eq. 37 holds since:

|z1 (tk ) − x(tk )| ≤ e∗m1 ≤ ϵmax + max(e∗mj ) = ϵ∗M
Case 2. When

z1

estimate denoted as

(38)

is impacted by an attack but at least one of the other estimators (with its

z2 )

is not, the following upper bound can be developed:

|z1 (tk ) − x(tk )| = |z1 (tk ) − z2 (tk ) + z2 (tk ) − x(tk )| ≤ |z1 (tk ) − z2 (tk )| + |z2 (tk ) − x(tk )|
(39)

≤ ϵmax + max(e∗mj ) = ϵ∗M , j = 1, . . . , M

where the last inequality follows from the fact that the detection algorithm was not activated (i.e.,

|z1 (tk ) − z2 (tk )| ≤ ϵmax ) and the assumption that the estimator producing z2
false sensor measurements (i.e.,

|z2 (tk ) − x(tk )| ≤ max(e∗mj )),

is not impacted by the

according to Assumption 2).

Theorem 3 below summarizes the stability properties of the system of Eq. 1 operated under the
proposed implementation strategy in Section Cyberattack-Resilient Output Feedback LEMPC: Implementation Strategy. This theorem re-purposes a bound on the allowable error in a state estimate
22, 21

supplied to an output feedback-based LEMPC in the absence of cyberattacks from.

Specically,

the proposed cyberattack detection method enables the bound in Eq. 37 to be dened, which allows
cyberattacks to be treated in the framework previously developed in

22, 21

for guaranteeing closed-

loop stability of output feedback LEMPC in the presence of measurement noise and disturbances,
and thereby allows the combined detection and control framework to guarantee closed-loop stability
when a cyberattack is not agged according to the proposed methodology.

Theorem 3. Consider the system of Eq. 1 in closed-loop under the LEMPC of Eq. 8 based on an

observer and controller pair satisfying Assumptions 1-2 and formulated with respect to the
measurement vector, and formulated with respect to a controller
Let the conditions of Proposition 3 hold, and

em0i ,

for

i = 1, . . . , M .

Also, let

h(·)

i = 1

that meets Eqs. 2a-2d and 3.

∗
∗
∗
, ϵi ∈ (ϵLi , ϵU i ), and |zi (t0 )−x(t0 )| ≤
θw ≤ θw∗ , θv,i ≤ θv,i

ϵW,1 > 0, ∆ > 0, Ωρ ⊂ X ,
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and

ρ > ρmax > ρ1,1 > ρe,1 > ρmin,1 >

ρs,1 > 0,

satisfy:

ρe,1 ≤ ρmax − max{fV (fW (ϵ∗M , ∆)), Mf max{tz1 , ∆}α4 (α1−1 (ρmax ))}

(40)

ρe,1 ≤ ρ − fV (fW (ϵ∗M , ∆)) − fV (ϵ∗M )

(41)

− α3 (α2−1 (ρs,1 )) + L′x (Mf ∆ + ϵ∗M ) + L′w θw ≤ −ϵW,1 /∆
ρmin,1 = max{V (x(t + ∆))|V (x(t)) ≤ ρs,1 }

(43)

ρmin,1 + fV (fW (ϵ∗M , ∆)) ≤ ρ

(44)

ρmax + fV (ϵ∗M ) ≤ ρ

(45)

where tz1 is the rst sampling time after tb1 , and
but with the subscripts dropped. Then, if
for

th ≥ max{∆, tz1 }

(42)

fV

and

fW

are dened as in Propositions 1 and 2

x(t0 ) ∈ Ωρe,1 , x(t) ∈ Ωρmax

for all

t≥0

and

z1 (th ) ∈ Ωρ

until a cyberattack is detected according to the implementation strategy in

Section Cyberattack-Resilient Output Feedback LEMPC: Implementation Strategy, if the attack
occurs after

tq .

Proof. The proof consists of four parts. In Part 1, feasibility of the output feedback LEMPC of
Eq. 8 is proven when
contained in

Ωρmax

for

z1 (tk ) ∈ Ωρ .

In Part 2, we prove that the closed-loop state trajectory is

t ∈ [t0 , max{∆, tz1 }).

before an attack occurs,

x(t)

In Part 3, we prove that for

t ≥ max{∆, tz1 }

z1 (t)

Ωρ .

Ωρmax

is bounded within

and

is bounded within

but

In Part 4,

we prove that if there is an attack at tk but it is not detected using the proposed methodology (i.e.,

|zi (t) − zj (t)| ≤ ϵmax ,
bounded in

for all

i = 1, . . . , M , j = 1, . . . , M ), x(t)

is bounded in

Ωρmax

and

z1 (t)

is

Ωρ .

Part 1. The Lyapunov-based controller

h(x)

implemented in sample-and-hold is a feasible so-

lution to the output feedback LEMPC of Eq. 8 when

p = k, . . . , k + N − 1, t ∈ [tp , tp+1 ),

x̃(tk ) = z1 (tk ) ∈ Ωρ .

Specically,

h(x(tp )),

is a feasible solution to the output feedback LEMPC of Eq. 8

because it meets the input constraints of Eq. 8e according to Eq. 2, it meets the state constraints

x̃(t) ∈ Ωρ ⊂ X ,

it trivially satises Eq. 8g, and it satises Eq. 8f because the region

is forward invariant under

h implemented in a sample-and-hold fashion when ρe,1 > ρmin,1 , due

of Eq. 8d when

Ωρe,1
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to the closed-loop stability properties of the Lyapunov-based controller (as noted in the proof of
Part 1 for Theorem 1).

Ωρmax

Part 2. To demonstrate boundedness of the closed-loop state in
the Lyapunov function value can be evaluated as follows:

∫

t

V (x(t)) = V (x(t0 )) +
t0

≤ ρe,1 +
for all

t ∈ [t0 , max{∆, tz1 }),

Ωρe,1 ⊂ Ωρ1,1 ⊂ Ωρmax .
x(t) ∈ Ωρmax

that

If

for all

ρe,1

∂V (x(τ ))
dτ = V (x(t0 )) +
∂t

is dened as in Eq. 40, then

x(t0 ) ∈

V (x(t)) ≤ ρmax , ∀t ∈ [t0 , max{∆, tz1 }),

t ≥ max{∆, tz1 }

|zj (tk )−x(tk )| ≤ max(e∗mj ), for all j = 1, . . . , M ).
z1 (tk ) ∈ Ωρ /Ωρe,1

z1 (tk ) ∈ Ωρe,1 .

In this case, either

z1 (tk ) ∈ Ωρe,1

so that the constraint of Eq. 8g is

Eq. 8f ensures that

x̃(t)

is maintained within

x(t) ∈ Ωρmax

and

z1 (t) ∈ Ωρ

From Proposition 1, we have the following:

|x̃(t) − x(t)| ≤ fW (|z1 (tk ) − x(tk )|, ∆) ≤ fW (ϵ∗M , ∆)
t ∈ [tk , tk+1 ),

for

(47)

where the last inequality follows from Assumption 2 (i.e., when

and before an attack,

|z1 (tk ) − x(tk )| ≤ e∗m1 ≤ ϵ∗M ).

t ≥ max{∆, tz1 }

From Proposition 2:

V (x(t)) ≤ V (x̃(t)) + fV (|x̃(t) − x(t)|) ≤ ρe,1 + fV (fW (ϵ∗M , ∆))
t ∈ [tk , tk+1 ),

for
if

x̃

(48)

where the second inequality follows from Eq. 8f and Eq. 47. If Eq. 40 holds, then

is maintained in

Ωρe,1 ,

the actual state

ensure that the estimate for

t ∈ [tk , tk+1 )

x(t)

is ensured to be inside

is also within

Ωρ ,

Ωρmax

for

t ∈ [tk , tk+1 ).

t ∈ [tk , tk+1 ).

When Eq. 41 holds, Eq. 49 gives that

z1 (tk ) ∈ Ωρe,1 , x(t)

is maintained within

Ωρmax

and

conditions of Theorem 3 hold.

28

z1 (t) ∈ Ωρ

z1 (t)

To

Eq. 48 and Proposition 2 give:

V (z1 (t)) ≤ V (x(t)) + fV (|x(t) − z1 (t)|) ≤ ρe,1 + fV (fW (ϵ∗M , ∆)) + fV (ϵ∗M )
for

so

and the process is not experiencing a

throughout the prediction horizon, so we must demonstrate that

t ∈ [tk , tk+1 ).

(46)

t ∈ [t0 , max{∆, tz1 }).

activated. Consider rst the case that

for

t0

∂V (x(τ ))
ẋ(τ ) dτ
∂x

where the latter inequality follows from Eq. 2, Eq. 5, and

so that the constraint of Eq. 8f is activated, or

Ωρe,1

t

t ∈ [t0 , max{∆, tz1 }),

Mf max{∆, tz1 }α4 (α1−1 (ρmax ))

Part 3. We now consider the case that
cyberattack (i.e.,

∫

for

for

t ∈ [tk , tk+1 ).

is maintained in

Ωρ

for

(49)

Therefore, when

t ∈ [tk , tk+1 )

if the

Next, we evaluate the case that
Eqs. 8g, 2, and 4b, the bound on
to/from

V̇ (x(t)) =

w,

z1 (tk ) ∈ Ωρ /Ωρe,1

(i.e., Eq. 8g is activated).

and adding and subtracting the term

Considering

∂V (x̃(tk ))
f (x̃(tk ), u(tk ), 0)
∂x

∂V (x(t))
f (x(t), u(tk ), w(t)) and using the triangle inequality, we obtain:
∂x

V̇ (x(t)) ≤ −α3 (|x̃(tk )|) + L′x |x(t) − x̃(tk )| + L′w θw
for all

x ∈ Ωρ .

|x(t) − x̃(tk )| ≤ |x(t) − x(tk )| + |x(tk ) − x̃(tk )|,

From

(50)

we obtain that:

|x(t) − x̃(tk )| ≤ |x(t) − x(tk )| + ϵ∗M

(51)

V̇ (x(t)) ≤ −α3 (α2−1 (ρs,1 )) + L′x (Mf ∆ + ϵ∗M ) + L′w θw

(52)

From Eqs. 5, 51, and 50:

for all

x̃ ∈ Ωρ /Ωρs,1 .

If the condition of Eq. 42 is satised, Eq. 52 gives:

V (x(t)) ≤ V (x(tk )) −
Thus, when

z1 (tk ) ∈ Ωρ /Ωρe,1 , if x(tk ) ∈ Ωρmax /Ωρs,1 , x(tk+1 ) ∈ Ωρmax .

guarantees that
When

ϵW,1 (t − tk )
, t ∈ [tk , tk+1 )
∆

x(t) ∈ Ωρmin,1 ⊂ Ωρmax

x(t) ∈ Ωρmax ,

this gives that

for

t ∈ [tk , tk+1 ).

V (z1 (t)) ≤ ρ

that the closed-loop state is contained within
estimate is inside

Ωρ

when

If instead

From Eq. 49,

(53)

x(tk ) ∈ Ωρs,1 , Eq. 43

V (z1 (t)) ≤ V (x(t)) + fV (ϵ∗M ).

if Eq. 45 holds. Applying this recursively indicates

Ωρmax

for all times and that the closed-loop state

t ≥ max{∆, tz1 }.

Part 4. Finally, we consider the case that at some

t ≥ max{∆, tq },

the process is under a false

sensor measurement cyberattack, but it is not detected by the proposed approach (i.e.,

zj (tk )| ≤ ϵmax

i = 1, . . . , M

for all

estimate is inside

Ωρ

and

j = 1, . . . , M ).

Since

|z1 (tk ) − x(tk )| ≤ ϵ∗M

and the state

by the implementation strategy, boundedness of the closed-loop state in

and state estimate in

Ωρ

Ωρmax

are again ensured by Part 3.

Remark 11. Although, the detection conditions have been derived for
and

|zi (tk ) −

|zi (tk ) − zj (tk )|, i = 1, . . . , M

j = 1, . . . , M , if full state feedback is available, it is possible that one of the redundant estimators

could be replaced by full state feedback (and/or that the resulting full state feedback could be used
in place of

z1

in the output feedback LEMPC of Eq. 8).
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When this is done, the results of this

section would continue to hold. Specically, following similar steps to those in Section CyberattackResilient Output Feedback LEMPC: Formulation, we obtain that:

|x̃(tk ) − zj (tk )| ≤ |x(tk ) + θv′ − zj (tk )| ≤ |x(tk ) − zj (tk )| + θv′
for

j = 2, . . . , M

(if the full state measurement takes the place of

max[max{e∗mj } + θv′ , max{e∗mj + e∗mi }], i = 2, . . . , M

and

guarantees of Theorem 3 to hold with this modied

ϵmax .

z1 ).

Dening

j = 2, . . . , M

(54)

ϵmax

for this case as

allows the control-theoretic

Remark 12. Ultimate boundedness of the closed-loop state of Eq. 1 within

Ωρmin,1

can also be

achieved under the LEMPC of Eq. 8 even in the presence of an attack by Part 3 of the proof of
Theorem 3 if the constraint of Eq. 8g begins to be always enforced after a certain time (whereas
this would not be guaranteed in the presence of an attack in Detection Strategies 1 and 2). This is
because not all sensors can be attacked for Detection Strategy 3, so that they eectively act like a
check of one another to prevent a signicant enough deviation of the actual state from the estimate
(i.e., that would prevent stability goals from being achieved) from occurring without detection. The
value of

ρmin,1 , however, is impacted by the size of ρe,1

is impacted by

ϵ∗M

(specically, it must be less than

according to the conditions of Theorem 3, so that if the value of

too large (allowing attacks that cause

zi , i = 1, . . . , M

ρe,1 ), which

ϵ∗M

becomes

to deviate more signicantly from

be allowed), it may become more dicult to nd a value of

ρmin,1

x

to

that meets the conditions of

Theorem 3.

Remark 13. To determine the number of sensors (and which) that could be attacked while closedloop stability is still guaranteed under the implementation strategy until the attack is detected, it
rst must be determined what redundant estimators will be used, and then dierent scenarios with
dierent sensors that could be attacked to cause at least one estimator to not be impacted could
be developed.

Cyberattack-Resilient Output Feedback LEMPC: Chemical Process Example
In this section, a chemical process example is used to illustrate Detection Strategy 3.

As in

Section Randomized LEMPC Changes to Probe for Cyberattacks: Chemical Process Example,
we use a nonlinear process model of a CSTR that follows the process dynamics of Eqs. 32-33. The
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process states are the reactant concentration of species

A (CA ) and temperature in the reactor (T ).

The manipulated input is the reactant feed concentration (CA0 ). The values of the parameters of
the CSTR model are taken from.
from their steady-state values,
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The vectors of deviation variables for the states and input

CAs = 2

x = [x1 x2 ]T = [CA − CAs T − Ts ]T

are

3
kmol/m ,
and

Ts = 350

CA0s = 4.0

K,

u = CA0 − CA0s .

3
kmol/m , respectively,

The process model represented by

Eqs. 32-33 is numerically integrated using the explicit Euler method with integration step of
h.

The economic stage cost

Le = k0 e−E/(RT ) CA2

10−3

was utilized for this proposed control/detection

scheme.
Lyapunov-based stability constraints in Eqs. 8f-8g were designed using a quadratic Lyapunov
function

V = xT P x ,

where

P = [110.11 0; 0 0.12].

a proportional controller of the form
(|u|

≤ 3.5

and

ρe = 330.

The Lyapunov-based controller utilized was

h(x) = −1.6x1 − 0.01x2

3
kmol/m ). The stability region was set to

x = [x1 x2 ]T

ρ = 440

(
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) subject to input constraints

(i.e.,

Ωρ = {x ∈ R2 : V (x) ≤ ρ})

The LEMPC receives full state feedback (Remark 11) with the full system state

which is measured and sent to the LEMPC at synchronous time instants

tk .

A high-

gain observer is used as the redundant estimator to estimate the reactant concentration of species

A

from continuously available temperature measurements (x2 ). The design of this high-gain observer
27

follows

with respect to a transformed system state obtained via input-output linearization. The

observer equation using the set of new coordinates is as follows:

ẑ˙ = Aẑ + L(y − C ẑ)
where

ẑ

is the state estimate vector in the new coordinate,

[0 1; 0 0], C = [1 0], and L = [100 10000]T .
transformation

T −1 (ẑ)

(55)

y

is the output measurement,

To obtain the state estimate of the system

A =

z , the inverse

is applied.

For the detection conditions of Eq. 36, data from an attack-free scenario is gathered by simulating
the process under the proposed LEMPC described above. We simulate this attack-free event over
1 h of operation with the system state initialized o steady-state at

xinit = [CA − CAs T − Ts ][−0.7

3
T
kmol/m -30 K] in MATLAB R2017b, with the function tolerance set to

10−7 .

A constraint of the

form of Eq. 8f was enforced at the end of each sampling period both when the constraint of Eq. 8g
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was activated and when it was not. The controller receives a state measurement subject to bounded
measurement noise and the process is subject to bounded disturbances. Specically, the noise is

3
represented by a standard normal distribution with mean zero, standard deviations of 0.01 kmol/m
3
and 0.5 K, and bounds of 0.02 kmol/m and 0.5 K for the concentration of the reactant and reactor
temperature, respectively. In addition, process disturbances was added to the right-hand side of
the dierential equations describing the rates of change of

CA

and

T

with zero mean and standard

3
3
deviations of 0.5 kmol/m h and 2 K/h, and bounds of 2 kmol/m h and 5 K/h, respectively. The
norm

|x̃(tk ) − z(tk )|

was taken to be

ϵmax

was bounded after 0.2 h under an attack-free simulation below 0.9520 (which
and used to ag attacks in the remainder of the example).

To ensure that not all estimators are impacted by attacks as required, the control system under
state feedback LEMPC is subjected to false state measurements of reactant concentration (which
have the form

x1 + 0.1

3
kmol/m h; i.e., the temperature measurements are intact and only the

full state feedback measurements are impacted with the high gain observer not impacted as it
only uses measurements of the un-attacked sensor, the temperature).

These false measurements

are always provided to the controller after 0.3 h of operation. We simulate the process under the
proposed control design over 1 h of operation with the process state initialized o steady-state
again from

xinit = [−0.7

3
T
kmol/m -30 K] in MATLAB R2017b using fmincon. The measurement

noise and disturbances follow the same standard normal distribution described above.

To solve

the optimization problem of Eq. 8, we use the following initial guess: at the rst sampling time
the value of the Lyapunov-based controller

h(x)

is used while for the subsequent sampling times,

a shifted version of the optimal solution of the previous sampling time is utilized and the guess of
the last entry of the optimal input vector is based on

h(x).

Fig. 2 depicts the closed-loop state

trajectory in contrast with the closed-loop state estimate trajectory after 0.2 h of operation. As
soon as the cyberattack policy was implemented at 0.3 h, the control/detection strategy promptly
agged abnormal behavior at the subsequent sampling time, when the closed-loop state was still
within the stability region, which could allow a backup policy to be employed.
We can also explore a case where an attack happens but the proposed detection mechanism does
not ag it during process operation. Specically, we consider that the false state measurements for
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Figure 2: Comparison between the closed-loop state trajectory under attack (solid line) and the closed-loop state
estimate trajectory (dashed lines) after 0.2 h of operation under the state feedback LEMPC.
reactant concentration above now have the form

x1 + 0.01

3
kmol/m h (which follows an attack

trajectory with similarities to that in Fig. 2 but a better match between the measurement and
estimate trajectories for

CA )

and are always provided to the controller after 0.3 h of operation.

In this case, although the attack was not agged during the simulation, the closed-loop state was
maintained in

Ωρ

under the proposed control design for the time period simulated, demonstrating

the concept that with the process subject to suciently small measurement noise and disturbances,
the closed-loop state can be maintained in

Ωρ .

The proposed control/detection approach may also identify an attack if both state measurements
are attacked as long as the condition

|x̃(tk ) − z(tk )| ≤ ϵmax

to ag an attack still holds (despite

that attack detection if all measurements are attacked is not guaranteed in Section CyberattackResilient Output Feedback LEMPC: Stability and Feasibility Analysis to be agged). To show this,
we consider the case where false state measurements of both reactant concentration and temperature
of the form

x1 + 0.01 kmol/m3

and

x2 + 1 K, respectively, are provided to the sensors after 0.3 h.

soon as this attack was implemented (at 0.3 h), an attack was detected since the norm

As

|x̃(tk )−z(tk )|

was larger than the threshold (again with the closed-loop state still in the stability region at the
detection time).

Conclusions

In light of the diculty of guaranteeing cyberattack-resilience using LEMPC design only, as was
14

analyzed in our prior work,

this work aimed to investigate how the control-theoretic guarantees of

LEMPC might be leveraged with detection techniques to attempt to prevent false sensor measure-
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ments from causing closed-loop stability issues in a chemical plant. Three cyberattack detection
concepts using LEMPC design were explored.

The rst strategy focused on the use of random

designs of LEMPC's around alternative steady-states within the stability region to check whether
the theoretical property of the randomly generated LEMPC's (i.e., that the value of the Lyapunov
function that the LEMPC is designed with respect to should decrease over the sampling period
following the activation of this LEMPC) is met by the process state measurements. The second
strategy focused on a state prediction, detection, and control framework that guarantees that the
closed-loop state is maintained in a stability region for one sampling period after an undetected
attack. Finally, the third strategy focused on a state estimation, detection, and control framework
that assumed that multiple state estimators were available for the process and that at least one
could be compromised by a false sensor measurement attack. A key challenge for future work is
better understanding the limits of what can be achieved, theoretically and fundamentally, in terms
of securing control systems against cyberattacks on their various components. This work focused
only on sensor attacks; however, there are many possible routes by which an attack may be performed on a cyberphysical system, and when the attacks are too extensive (e.g., the attacker gains
control of many aspects of the control loop) it may be dicult to provide guarantees on process
behavior during the attack.
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Figure 4: Comparison between the closed-loop state trajectory under attack (solid line) and the closed-loop state
estimate trajectory (dashed lines) after 0.2 h of operation under the state feedback LEMPC.
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